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Mark E. Ooms and J. Bradford Jensen
Over the past 20 years, there has been a several-fold increase in the foreign
ownership ofU.S. assets. This increase has generated interest, sometimes con-
cern, over the effects of foreign direct investment (FOI) on the economy (see
Graham and Krugman 1989; Froot and Stein 1991; McCulloch 1993). The
interest has focused on the nature of employment opportunities provided by
foreign-owned plants and their contribution to productivity. How do foreign
plants compare to domestically owned plants in terms ofwages and productiv-
ity? If foreign companies can overcome the costs ofentering the U.S. market,
this might signal that these companies have specific advantages, such as supe-
rior product design, greater production efficiency, and advanced marketing
skill, relative to their domestically owned competitors. As a result, these for-
eign companies might outperform domestically owned plants in a number of
respects, including productivity and wages. Alternatively, foreign firms might
keep most of their high value-added operations in their home countries, with
their U.S. operations consisting primarilyoflower value-added assembly oper-
ations. In this case, foreign-owned establishments in the United States would
have relatively low skilled workers, and hence relatively low wages, and not
necessarily high productivity. Whichever case predominates, these arguments
suggest that establishments owned by multinational corporations, regardless of
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country of ownership, might differ from establishments owned by companies
with only domestic operations.
We compare the operating characteristics of foreign-owned and domes-
tically owned plants using detailed data from a large number of U.S. manu-
facturing establishments. We present evidence on how foreign-owned plants
compare to domestically owned plants in terms of employment, wages,
productivity, capital intensity, and technology. Previously, researchers have
identified differences between foreign-owned plants and domestically owned
plants using more aggregated data. Using industry-level data, Howenstine and
Zeile (1992) suggest that foreign-owned plants pay higher wages than domesti-
cally ownedestablishments. Further, foreign-owned plants account for a larger
share of employment in industries that are capital intensive and skilled labor
intensive. This research uses industry-level data, which might hide consider-
able plant-level heterogeneity within the class of foreign- and domestically
owned plants.
The heterogeneity across establishments within industries is substantial. In
fact, within-industry variance in wages and productivity exceeds the interin-
dustry variance (for wages, see Davis and Haltiwanger 1991; and for produc-
tivity, see Baily, Hulten, and Campbell 1992). Thus, using plant-level data to
examine differences across plants within an industry offers advantages over
industry-level data. Howenstine and Zeile (1994) use plant- and subindustry-
level data from the Annual Survey ofManufactures for 1989 and 1990 and find
that foreign-owned plants are larger, more capital intensive, and more produc-
tive and pay higher wages than domestically owned plants. Globerman, Ries,
and Vertinsky (1994) use Canadian plant-level data and examine the economic
performance of foreign affiliates in Canada. They find that foreign affiliate
plants are more productive than Canadian-owned plants but that when other
plant characteristics (size, capital intensity, share of nonproduction workers,
and share ofmale workers) are controlled for, these differences disappear. Fur-
ther, Globerman et al. do not find statistically significant differences in perfor-
mance between foreign-owned Canadian plants by country ofownership.
In this paper, we make use ofnewly available manufacturing plant-level data
for 1987 (approximately 115,000 observations) that allow us to control for
industry, size, age, and location and more rigorously test for differences be-
tween the operating characteristics of foreign- and domestically owned plants
than previous research. Our initial results suggest that even controlling for
four-digit industry, state, plant age, and plant size, foreign-owned plants are
more productive, rely relatively more on capital than labor, and pay higher
wages than domestically owned plants.
To investigate the sources ofthe observed differences between foreign- and
domestically owned plants, we suggest a more useful categorization ofowner-
ship. We classify plants based on the nationality of ownership, firm size, and
whether U.S.-owned plants belong to firms that have significant assets outside237 Comparing Wages, Skills, and Productivity
the United States, This allows us to compare plants of foreign multinationals
to plants of U.S. multinationals, plants of large domestically oriented firms,
and plants ofsmall U.S. firms. When we compare across these four categories,
we find different results. As a group, the U.S. multinationals are the most pro-
ductive, biggest, and most capital intensive and pay the highest wages. The
foreign multinationals follow closely in terms of pay and productivity, fol-
lowed by large domestically oriented plants.
These results suggest that multinational firms, whether foreign or domestic,
have the most productive, most capital intensive, highest paying plants. Thus,
comparing foreign-owned plants to all domestic plants is in some ways com-
paring apples and oranges. Plants owned by multinationals tend to be much
bigger than the average plant in the United States and have the characteristics
associated with size. Thus, it is true that foreign-owned plants have desirable
characteristics relative to the whole of U.S. manufacturing. However, when
compared to plants owned by U.S. multinationals, foreign-owned plants do not
compare as favorably. Further, the results are consistent with the theory that
firm-specific advantages, like productivity, enable firms, whether U.S. or for-
eign, to overcome the barriers to direct foreign investment.
The rest ofthe paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe
the 1987 Foreign Direct Investment Survey-Census of Manufactures link and
our four firm classifications. Section 7.2 focuses on regression results compar-
ing foreign- and domestically owned establishments for basic operating char-
acteristics of establishments-wages, worker mix, productivity. Section 7.3
extends the analysis of section 7.2 by segregating domestic firms into three
categories. Sections 7.4 and 7.5 examine the differences by country ofowner-
ship and the use of advanced manufacturing technologies in foreign-owned
plants. Section 7.6 concludes.
7.1 Data Description
This section describes the data used in the subsequent analysis. The data set
used in this paper is a combination ofseveral establishment-level data sets: the
1987 Census of Manufactures (CM), 1987 Central Administrative Offices and
Auxiliary Establishment Survey, 1988 Survey of Manufacturing Technology
(SMT), and the 1987 Bureau ofEconomic Analysis (BEA) Foreign Direct In-
vestment Survey. Through ajoint project between BEA and the Bureau ofthe
Census, the 1987 FDI Survey was linked to the 1987 Standard Statistical Es-
tablishment List, of which the 1987 CM, 1988 SMT, and Auxiliary Reports
are subsets. 1The CM provides information on shipments, value added, capital,
production workers, nonproduction workers, wages, and othertypes ofproduc-
tion information. The CM has this data for approximately 200,000 establish-
1. For more information on the Censlis-BEA link, see U.S. Department ofCommerce (1992).238 Mark E. Doms and J. Bradford Jensen
ments. The SMT provides information on the use of 17 advanced manufactur-
ing technologies for a sample of approximately 10,000 manufacturing
establishments.
In this paper we examine how labor productivity, the mix of production
workers and nonproduction workers, and the wages of production and non-
production workers vary according to whether establishments are domestically
or foreign owned. Some of these variables require accurate measures of non-
production workers. One problem that arises is that nonproduction workers
involved in production might not be physically located at manufacturing es-
tablishments. Instead, some nonproduction workers might be located at
manufacturing auxiliary establishments. Manufacturing auxiliaries are those
establishments that do not manufacture goods but are the locations for such
things as R&D labs, headquarters, and data-processing centers. The measure-
ment problem that arises is that in some firms these auxiliary functions are
performed at manufacturing sites while in other firms these functions are per-
formed at auxiliary establishments. If the nonproduction workers located at
auxiliaries are excluded, then labor productivity will be biased upward, and
nonproduction worker wages will most likely be biased downward since auxil-
iaries tend to pay above average wages. One reason why the issue of nonpro-
duction workers is ofparticular interest in this paper is that the mix ofworkers
in manufacturing operations gives some indication of the activities being per-
formed in the country.
We present results with and without adjustments for auxiliary employment
2
We use data from the 1987 Central Administrative Offices andAuxiliary Estab-
lishment Survey to make the auxiliary adjustments. First, for each firm we
compute the total number of nonproduction workers and their salaries (each
firm might have more than one manufacturing auxiliary) located in manufac-
turing auxiliaries. Second, we distribute these auxiliary workers and their
wages across all manufacturing establishments of the firm. The proportion of
auxiliary workers and auxiliary wage bill that an establishment receives de-
pends on the share ofthe firm's nonproduction workers that establishment has.
For instance, if an establishment has 30 percent of the firm's nonproduction
workers who are employed at manufacturing establishments, we allocate to
that plant 30 percent ofthe firm's auxiliary workers.
The FDI data that we currently have access to provide the country of ulti-
mate beneficial ownership for the enterprise to which each establishment be-
longs. In the FDI Survey, "a U.S. affiliate is a U.S. business enterprise that is
owned 10 percentor more, directly or indirectly, by a foreign person." Unfortu-
nately, we do not have degree offoreign ownership. Therefore, in the analysis
that follows, we treat all foreign-owned establishments equally.
In our analysis, there is significant sample attrition in terms of the number
2. This assuages, to someextent, a criticismofwork that uses U.S. establishment-level manufac-
turing data, namely, that nonproduction workers are being undercounted in multiplant firms.239 Comparing Wages, Skills, and Productivity
ofestablishments and, to a much lesser degree, in terms ofmanufacturing em-
ployment. The 1987 population ofmanufacturing establishments in the United
States was approximately 350,000. About 200,000 of these establishments
were mailed a 1987 Census ofManufactures form that requested information
on shipments, labor, wages, and capital. The production data for the other
150,000 records, known as administrative records, are imputed and therefore
cannot be used in our analysis. Administrative records almost always have
fewer than five employees. The next largest source ofattrition is the dropping
ofrecords with impute flags. An impute flag is set if anyone of the following
four variables was not reported by the establishment: employment, salaries and
wages, materials, and total value of shipments. We dropped all records with
impute flags. These records tend to be below average in terms of size. Table
7.1 reports the number of establishments, employment, average employment,
and average earnings for the 1987 CM and some basic statistics for our final
sample.
We also make use of the 1987 Large Company Survey (ES9100). The
ES9100 is mailed to all enterprises with more than 500 employees. We use the
ES9100 to identify whether domestically owned firms have significant foreign
assets. Firms are asked to report "all assets in foreign countries, and U.S. pos-
sessions, regardless oftype." Unfortunately, we do not know the nature ofthese
assets. We divide foreign assets by total assets, and if the ratio of foreign to
total assets is greater than 10 percent, we classify the firm as having foreign
exposure (or as a U.S. multinational, for short).3 If the ratio is less than 10
percent, we classify the firm as being a large U.S. firm without foreign expo-
sure (or a large domestic firm). Unfortunately, the ES9100 is only mailed to
firms with more than 500 employees, so there is a significant number ofestab-
lishments for which we do not have foreign asset information. We classify
firms with fewer than 500 employees as small U.S. firms. Table 7.1 also pres-
ents the breakdown ofestablishments by domestic ownership type.
7.2 U.S.-Owned Establishments Compared to Foreign-
Owned Establishments
We begin by comparing the plant characteristics of U.S.-owned establish-
ments to foreign-owned establishments. The discussion of foreign ownership
of manufacturing facilities has typically focused on the nature ofemployment
opportunities. Some suggest thatforeign-owned plants undertake a set ofactiv-
ities different from that pursued by domestic plants and therefore use a differ-
ent class of workers, pay lower wages, and are less productive than domesti-
cally owned plants. Other theories of FDI suggest that foreign-owned plants
3. Note that this definition differs from BEA's definition of a "parent" multinational. BEA de-
fines a parent as any U.S. enterprise that owns 10 percent or more ofa foreign entity. We do not
observe the nature ofthe foreign assets in the ES9100. For more analysis ofthe sensitivity ofthis
definition of U.S. "multinational" see Doms and Jensen (1997).240 Mark E. Doms and J. Bradford Jensen
Table 7.1 Basic Sample Statistics: Comparison between Samples
and Populations
Average Average
Sample or Number of Total Employment per Annual
Population Establishments Employment Establishment Earnings"
1987 eM manufacturing
population 358,941 17,716,649 49.4 19.08
Total sample 115,139 12,420,340 107.9 21.44
Foreign population 7,077 1,180,686 168.8 26.55
Foreign sample 4,463 853,338 191.2 24.95
Domestic population 351,864 16,535,963 47.0 18.92
Domestic sample 110,676 11,567,002 104.5 21.30
Small domestic 87,030 3,902,625 44.8 20.78
Large domestic 15,920 4,229,001 265.6 21.87
U.S. multinational 7,726 3,435,376 444.6 25.90
"In thousands ofdollars per employee.
belong to firms that have specific advantages that enable them to invest in new
markets. These advantages include superior product design, greaterproduction
efficiency, and advanced marketing skill. We investigate these claims by com-
paring measures of average annual wages, skill mix, capital-labor ratios, and
productivity between foreign-owned establishments and domestically owned
establishments. Table 7.2 provides more precise definitions of the operating
characteristics that we use in our comparisons.
In table 7.1 we saw that foreign-owned plants are larger than domestically
owned plants. Table 7.3 reports plant means and standard deviations for the
operating characteristics of each class of plant. We see that foreign-owned
plants do differ from domestically owned plants. Foreign-owned plants pay
higher wages to both production workers and nonproduction workers. Produc-
tion workers in domestic plants average about $18,760 in earnings in 1987,
while production workers in foreign plants average about $22,290 in 1987.
The difference in earnings ofnonproduction workers is not as large. Without
taking auxiliary employment into account, foreign plants pay nonproduction
workers about $32,I00 a year and domestically owned plants pay about
$30,370. When we adjust for nonproduction worker employment at auxiliary
establishments, the difference between domestically owned and foreign-owned
establishments declines. What is the source of these earnings differentials?
One possibility is differences in human capital. Beyond paying higher
wages, foreign-owned establishments are more nonproduction worker inten-
sive than domestic plants, whether auxiliary employment is included or not.
Foreign-owned plants use a higher share ofnonproduction, orskilled, workers.
This in itself would not explain the wage differential for the different catego-






Nonproduction worker wages (1)















Annual salaries (thousand $) for production workers/
number ofproduction workers
Annual salaries (thousand $) for nonproduction workers/
number of nonproduction workers
Same as Nonproduction worker wages (1) except with
an adjustment made for employment and payroll in
auxiliaries
Number ofproduction workers/total employment
Number of production workers/total employment, where
total employment is adjusted for auxiliary employment
Book value of machinery and building assets
(thousand $)/total employment
Book value of machinery and building assets
(thousand $)/total employment, where total
employment is adjusted for auxiliary employment
Value added (thousand $)/total employment
Value added (thousand $)/total employment, where total
employment is adjusted for auxiliary employment
Natural logarithm oftotal factor productivity calculated
from using the residual from a value-added Cobb-
Douglas production function"
Natural logarithm oftotal factor productivity calculated
using a factor share method
b
B. Independent Variables
Categorical variable band on total plant employment
(TE):
Size class I: 1 :::; TE < 50
Size class 2: 50:::; TE < 100
Size class 3: 100 :::; TE < 250
Size class 4: 250 :::; TE < 500
Size class 5: 500 :::; TE < 1,000
Size class 6: 1,000 :::; TE < 2,500
Size class 7: 2,500 :::; TE (omitted category)
Categorical variable based on year offirst CM
appearance:
Age class 63: First appearance in census is 1963
Age class 67: First appearance in census is 1967
Age class 72: First appearance in census is 1972
Age class 77: First appearance in census is 1977
Age class 82: First appearance in census is 1982
Age class 87: First appearance in census is 1987
(omitted category)






Dummy variable representing state in which plant is
located
"The residual measure is calculated using a Cobb-Douglas specification with capital, labor, and
materials (including parts, fuels, and services) included as inputs. The regression coefficients are
from four-digit industry regressions.
hThe factor share method is calculated using the median factor shares ofcapital, labor, and materi-
als (including parts, fuels, and services) from the four-digit industry. This method is similar to that
used in Baily et al. (1992).
Table 7.3
Variable
Variable Means by Foreign and Domestic Ownership
Domestic Foreign
Production worker wages (thousand $)
Nonproduction worker wages (I) (thousand $)
Nonproduction worker wages (2) (thousand $)
Production workers/Total employment (I)
Production workers/Total employment (2)
Capital/Employment (I) (thousand $)
Capital/Employment (2) (thousand $)
Value added/Employment (I) (thousand $)















































Note: See table 7.2 for variable definitions. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
foreign-owned plants also used more skilled or more educated workers within
a category, this might explain the observed higher wages within categories.
Supporting this claim is Troske (1994), who finds that worker characteristics
account for a significant portion ofobserved cross-plant wage differentials in
a sample ofplants from the 1987 eM. Unfortunately, we do not have any addi-
tional information on the workers in our establishments. Another possibility is243 Comparing Wages, Skills, and Productivity
that foreign-owned plants pay a wage premium to deter unionization. Although
we cannot test this hypothesis, we include controls for state and industry.
Foreign-owned plants are more capital intensive and more productive.
Foreign-owned plants average approximately $103,000 in capital assets per
employee (without adjusting for auxiliary employment), while domestic plants
average about $40,000 in capital assets per employee. After adjusting for auxil-
iary employment, the differential is still quite large, though reduced. Foreign-
owned plants have higher labor productivity (which might be due to the higher
capital-labor ratio at foreign plants) and higher total factor productivity (TFP),
which takes into account the higher capital-labor ratio.
These results suggest that foreign plants differ significantly from domestic
plants. However, other studies, such as Howenstine and Zeile (1992, 1994),
show that foreign-owned plants are concentrated in industries that are more
capital intensive, pay higher wages, and are more productive. Thus, the ob-
served differences described above could be due to industry composition ef-
fects. Column (1) of table 7.4 presents regression results comparing foreign-
owned plants to domestically owned plants without industry, location, age, or
size controls.
4 The regression coefficients in column (l) of table 7.4 tell the
same story as the means reported in table 7.3. Foreign-owned plants are sig-
nificantly more capital intensive, are more productive, and pay higher wages,
but this may be due to composition effects. To control for possible composition
effects, we include controls for plant size, industry, plant age, and plant loca-
tion.5 In column (2), we present regression results that control for these other
plant characteristics. When we include controls for plant size, industry (four-
digit), plant age, and plant location (state), the observed differences between
foreign-owned and domestically owned plants decrease but persist.
The equations controlling for size, age, industry, and location still show that
foreign-owned plants pay about 7 percent more to production workers and 1
to 2 percent more to nonproduction workers. Foreign-owned plants are about
30 percent more capital intensive and have about 20 percent higher labor pro-
ductivity than domestically owned plants ofthe same age and size, in the same
location and industry. In terms ofTFP, foreign-owned plants are about 2 to 4
percent more productive. Further, foreign-owned plants use fewer production
workers than domestically owned plants.
4. The regression coefficients reponed in col. (I) oftable 7.4 arc from a regression ofthe depen-
dent variable on an intercept term and a dummy variable that is one if the establishment is foreign
owned. These results represent the mean differences between foreign-owned plants and domesti-
cally owned plants. See the appendix for a more detailed description of the specification.
5. The regression coefficients reponed in col. (2) of table 7.4 are the coefficients from a dummy
variable representing whether a plant is foreign owned. The specification also includes controls
for plant size, plant age, plant industry, and plant location. We include as controls seven plant-size
dummy variables based on employment at the plant. We choose this form ofcontrols as it allows
more flexibility than imposing a linear restriction by induding a continuous measure of plant
employment. We control for plant age by including a categorical variable representing the first
eM in which the plant appears. We also include dummy variables for four-digit industry and state.
See the appendix for a more detailed description of the specification.244 Mark E. Doms and J. Bradford Jensen
Table 7.4 Differences between Domestically and Foreign-
Owned Establishments
Foreign Owned Foreign Owned
No Controls With Controls
Dependent Variable (I) (2)
log Production worker wages .190 .073
(.007) (.006)
log Nonproduction worker wages (I) .104 .012
(.008) (.008)
log Nonproduction worker wages (2) .130 .026
(.008) (.008)
Production workers/Total -.052 -.020
employment (I) (.003) (.003)
Production workers/Total -.084 -.031
employment (2) (.003) (.003)
log Capital/Employment (I) .941 .332
(.018) (.015)
log Capital/Employment (2) .877 .308
(.017) (.014)
log Value added/Employment (I) .537 .211
(.010) (.009)























Note: The numbers are regression coefficients from linear models that do and do not control for
establishment size, four-digit industry, plant age, and state. The omitted group is domestically
owned establishments. Numberofobservations is approximately 115,000. Numbers in parentheses
are standard errors.
aK/L = capital-labor ratio (capital intensity).
Following Globerman et al. (1994), we also include the capital-labor ratio
as a control variable. Globerman et al. find that when they include size, capital
intensity, and percentage ofmales in the plant,6 the observable labor productiv-
ity difference between Canadian and foreign-owned plants becomes statisti-
cally insignificant. We report the results of including capital intensity among
the controls in column (3) of table 7.4.7 The differences are reduced, but the
differential for productivity is still positive and statistically significant. Includ-
ing the capital-labor ratio also reduces the observed wage premium to produc-
6. We cannot replicate the percentage of males in the plant as we do not know the composition
ofworkers by gender in the plant.
7. We do not include the capital-laborratio in the TFP regressions as the capital and labor inputs
are already controlled for in a less restrictive manner.245 Comparing Wages, Skills, and Productivity
tion workers, but it is still positive and statistically significant at about 3.8
percent.
These results suggest that the differences between foreign- and domestically
owned plants are partially the result ofindustry, size, age, and location effects.
Including controls for these effects reduces the observed differences between
domestically and foreign-owned plants. However, the differences do not disap-
pear. Even after controlling for these effects, foreign-owned plants still have
superior operating characteristics relative to domestic plants.
The results suggest that some of the fears expressed over FDI are unwar-
ranted. Foreign-owned plants are more capital intensive, are more productive,
pay higher wages, and use a higher proportion of nonproduction workers than
the average U.S.-owned plant. Further, although some of the differences be-
tween foreign-owned and domestically owned plants are the result ofindustry
composition effects, foreign-owned plants still have superioroperating charac-
teristics compared to domestically owned plants controlling for industry, state,
age, and size. While these results are suggestive of the impact of foreign-
owned plants onthe domestic economy, the results do not speak to the potential
sources ofthe different operating characteristics. In section 7.3 we further de-
compose the plants by ownership type to investigate potential sources of the
differences in operating characteristics.
7.3 Foreign-Owned Establishments Compared to U.S.
Multinational Establishments
In section 7.2 we compared foreign-owned plants to all domestically owned
plants. For some purposes, this is the relevant comparison. However, in trying
to uncover the sources ofthese differences, a more detailed comparison might
prove fruitful. According to theories of multinational investment, firms that
engage in FDI have some firm-specific advantages that allow them to overcome
the hurdles ofFDI. Thus, we might expect that plants owned by foreign multi-
national corporations would be more productive than the average domestically
owned plant. However, ifthis theory ofFDI is correct, we would expect to find
that plants owned by U.S. multinational corporations would also have these
superior characteristics. To investigate this possibility, we further divide our
sample and compare plants owned by U.S. multinationals to foreign-owned
plants.
We divide plants into four categories: (I) plants owned by foreign compa-
nies, (2) plants owned by U.S. firms with fewer than 500employees, (3) plants
owned by U.S. firms with more than 500 employees without significant foreign
assets, and (4) plants owned by U.S. firms with more than 500 employees and
foreign assets comprising more than 10 percent of total assets. For ease of
exposition, we call the first group "foreign-owned plants," the second group
"small U.S. firm plants," the third group "large domestic firm plants," and the
fourth group "U.S. multinationals."246 Mark E. Doms and J. Bradford Jensen
Table 7.5 Differences between Foreign-Owned Establishments and Domestic




Dependent Variable Owned Firm Firm
log Production worker wages -.029 -.069 -.152
(.007) (.005) (.005)
log Nonproduction worker wages (I) -.004 -.025 -.020
(.010) (.007) (.007)
log Nonproduction worker wages (2) -.039 -.050 -.095
(.010) (.007) (.007)
Production workers/Total employment (I) -.021 .008 -.006
(.003) (.002) (.002)
Production workers/Total employment (2) .009 .036 .056
(.003) (.003) (.002)
log Capital/Employment (I) -.062 -.212 -.605
(.017) (.013) (.012)
log Capital/Employment (2) -.006 -.156 - .488
(.017) (.013) (.012)
log Value added/Employment (I) -.082 -.166 -.446
(.010) (.008) (.007)
log Value added/Employment (2) -.026 -.110 -.329
(.010) (.007) (.007)
TFP-R -.036 -.042 -.111
(.006) (.004) (.004)
TFP-FS -.024 -.024 -.073
(.007) (.005) (.005)
Note: All numbers are regression coefficients from linear models that control for establishment
size, four-digit industry, plant age, and state. Number of observations is approximately 115,000.
Omitted plant type is U.S. multinational. Numbers in parentheses are standard elTors.
In table 7.5 we present regressions comparing plant characteristics for the
four plant types (plants ofU.S. multinationals is the omitted category). Plants
of U.S. multinationals pay the highest wages to both production and nonpro-
duction workers. Production workers are paid 2.9 percent less at foreign-
owned plants, 6.9 percent less at large domestic firm plants, and 15.2 percent
less at small U.S. firm plants relative to U.S. multinationals. Nonproduction
workers at U.S. multinationals do not enjoy as large a pay premium as produc-
tion workers; the differential ranges from 0.4 percent lower at foreign-owned
plants to 2.0 percent lower at small U.S. firm plants (when auxiliary employ-
ment is not included), and 3.9 percent lower at foreign-owned plants to 9.5
percent lower for small U.S. firm plants (when auxiliary employment is in-
cluded).H
8. The nonproduction wage differential increases when auxiliary employment is included be-
cause large firms tend to have more auxiliary employment and auxiliaries have above average
wages.247 Comparing Wages, Skills, and Productivity
Plants owned by U.S. multinationals are also the most capital intensive. The
capital-labor ratio of foreign-owned plants is 6.2 percent lower than that of
U.S. multinational plants. Plants of large domestic firms have a 21.2 percent
lower capital-labor ratio, and plants of small U.S. firms have a 60.5 percent
lower capital-labor ratio. When employment at auxiliary establishments is in-
cluded in total employment, the results change. With auxiliary employment
included, foreign-owned plants are not statistically different from plants of
U.S. multinationals in terms of capital-labor ratios. Plants of large and small
U.S. firms still have lower capital-labor ratios, although the differences have
decreased to 15,6 percent lower and 48.8 percent lower, respectively. The addi-
tion ofauxiliary employmentincreases employmentfor plants ofU.S, multina-
tionals the most. Thus, the capital-labor ratio at these plants decreases relative
to the other plant classes when auxiliary employment is included.
In terms oflabor productivity and TFP, plants ofU.S. multinationals are the
most productive. Labor productivity (without adjusting for auxiliary employ-
ment) is 8,2 percent lower at foreign-owned plants than at plants ofU.S. multi-
nationals. Labor productivity is even lower at plants of large domestic firms,
16.6 percent lower, and lower still at plants of small U.S. firms, 44.6 percent
lower. When auxiliary employment is included, the differentials decrease but
are still significant. ForTFP, the story is much the same. Foreign-owned firms
have 3.6 percent lower TFP than plants of U.S. multinationals. For plants of
domestic firms, plants oflarge firms have 4.2 percent lower TFP and plants of
small firms have 11.1 percent lower TFP. Again, when auxiliary employment
is included, the productivity differentials decrease but are still significant.
These results, and the results from section 7.2, suggest that while foreign-
owned plants do indeed have different, and in many ways superior, characteris-
tics compared to the average U.S.-owned plant, there is considerable heteroge-
neity within the class of u'S,-owned plants. When we divide U.S.-owned
plants and look at plants of U.S. multinationals, we see that they compare
favorably with foreign-owned plants and with all other domestically owned
plants. Further, the results suggest that the plants of multinationals, whether
U.S. or foreign, are the most alike and possess superior operating characteris-
tics. These results suggest that plants of multinational corporations are the
most productive, are the most capital intensive, and pay the highest wages. This
finding is consistent with the notion that multinationals possess firm-specific
advantages, whether superior product design, greater production efficiency, or
advanced marketing skill, that enable them to overcome the barriers to FDI.
7.4 Comparing Plant Characteristics Based on Country of Ownership
We also break out the plants by country of ownership. Vernon (1993) sug-
gests that in the past researchers have found it useful to distinguish multina-
tional enterprises according to their national bases. He further suggests that
this dimension will become less useful in the future. We examine differences in
the operating characteristics offoreign-owned plants by country ofownership.248 Mark E. Doms and J. Bradford Jensen
Table 7.6 presents the wage, labor mix, capital-labor ratio, and productivity
results. One interesting feature is that no country compares favorably with
plants owned by U.S. multinationals. Further, plants owned by Japanese firms
do not seem to perform as well as might be expected based on popular percep-
tions. Plants owned by Japanese firms have the lowest labor productivity of
foreign-owned plants and the lowest and second lowest measured TFP.
9 These
data are from 1987. Much of the Japanese investment in the United States was
done in the early 1980s. While we control for plant age, using the year of the
first eM that the plant appears in as a proxy for age, this might not adequately
control for age effects. 10 Thus, it is possible that the low productivity numbers
for Japan reflect start-up costs. In terms of labor market characteristics, Japan
and Australia are again relatively poor performers. Both pay their production
workers less than other foreign-owned plants. While plants owned by multina-
tionals from these countries exhibit lower productivity and production worker
wages relative to plants owned by other multinationals, they compare favorably
to nonmultinational domestically owned plants.
7.5 Technology Use at Foreign- and Domestically Owned Plants
We examine the use ofadvanced technologies at foreign-owned and domes-
tically owned plants. One potential advantage of FDI is technology transfer. If
foreign plants are more technologically advanced than domestic plants, these
plants might produce technological spillovers. We use data from the Survey
ofManufacturing Technology to examine technology use in domestically and
foreign-owned plants. The SMT provides infOlmation on the use of 17 ad-
vanced manufacturing technologies for a sample of approximately 10,000
manufacturing plants. I I We use the number oftechnologies reported as present
in a manufacturing plant as a measure ofthe technology intensity at that plant.
Table 7.7 presents results for regressions with the number of technologies
as the dependent variable comparing domestically owned and foreign-owned
establishments. On average, foreign plants do use more technologies than do-
mestic plants. However, when we control for industry, location, plant size, and
plant age, the difference is reduced and marginally significant. When we con-
trol for the capital-labor ratio at the plant, the difference is negligible. Table
7.8 presents results for the comparison with plants owned by U.S. multination-
als. We see that plants owned by U.S. multinationals are the most technology-
9. The other country whose plants seem to perform relatively poorly is Australia.
10. We use the first census a plant appears in to proxy for the age ofthe plant. This identifies a
plant birth to prior to one of six five-year censuses: birth prior to the J963, I967, J972, J977,
1982. or 1987 eM. A problem that arises with this definition is that it pertains to new facilities,
commonly referred to as "greenfield" plants. The definition does not measure how long the facility
has been operated by a particular finn. Unfortunately, we do not know how long a plant has been
owned by a foreign finn.
II. For more information on the design and coverage of the SMT, see Dunne and Schmitz
(992).Table 7.6 Cross-Country Comparisons
log Non- log Non- Production Production
log production production Workers! Workers! log log log Value log Value
Production Worker Worker Total Total Capital! Capital! Added! Added!
Worker Wages Wages Employment Employment Labor Labor Employee Employee
Establishment Ownership Wages (I) (2) (I) (2) (I) (2) (I) (2) TFP-R TFP-FS
Australia -.157 .094 .007 -.029 .013 .077 .164 -.192 -.106 -.068 -.095
(.038) (.053) (.052) (.018) (.018) (.095) (.094) (.056) (.056) (.030) (.038)
Canada -.036 -.025 -.067 -.027 .008 -.036 .033 -.059 .010 -.013 -.017
(.015) (.021 ) (.020) (.007) (.007) (.038) (.037) (.022) (.022) (.012) (.015)
France -.054 -.001 -.081 -.022 .020 -.219 -.136 -.121 -.037 -.015 .021
(.020) (.030) (.029) (.010) (.010) (.051 ) (.05l) (.030) (.030) (.016) (.020)
Germany .011 .046 .006 -.026 -.004 .130 .173 -.015 .029 -.032 -.035
(.018) (.025) (.025) (.009) (.009) (.046) (.046) (.027) (.027) (.0IS) (.018)
Japan -.058 -.028 -.039 .018 .059 .001 .080 -.207 -.177 -.102 -.078
(.019) (.027) (.026) (.009) (.009) (.047) (.047) (.028) (.028) (.015) (.019)
Netherlands -.047 -.027 .032 .016 .002 .077 .051 .049 .024 -.020 -.019
(.024) (.033) (.032) (.0II) (.011) (.059) (.059) (.035) (.035) (.019) (.023)
Other .016 .049 - .009 -.006 .035 -.056 .021 -.101 -.025 -.041 -.042
(.015) (.022) (.021) (.007) (.007) (.039) (.039) (.023) (.023) (.012) (.015)
Sweden .041 -.008 -.039 -.055 -.020 -.117 -.048 -.154 -.084 -.025 -.027
(.030) (.043) (.042) (.014) (.015) (.076) (.076) (.045) (.045) (.024) (.030)
Switzerland -.028 .003 .004 -.006 -.005 .058 .031 .064 .038 - .004 .016
(.024) (.033) (.032) (.011 ) (.011) (.059) (.059) (.035) (.035) (.019) (.023)
United Kingdom -.042 -.032 -.071 -.042 -.007 -.172 -.114 -.097 ~.038 -.039 -.013
(.011 ) (.016) (.015) (.005) (.005) (.027) (.027) (.OJ6) (.016) (.009) (.011)
U.S. small firm -.151 -.020 -.095 - .007 .056 -.607 -- .4S9 -.447 -.329 -.112 -.073
(.005) (.007) (.007) (.002) (.002) (.012) (.012) (.007) (.007) (.004) (.005)
U.S. large domestic firm -.069 -.025 -.051 .008 .036 -.214 -.157 -.167 -.110 -.042 -.024
(.005) (.007) (.007) (.002) (.002) (.013) (.013) (.008) (.008) (,004) (.005)
Note: All coefficients are relative to U.S. multinational firms. All numbers are regression coefficients from linear models that control for establishment size. four-digit industry. plant age. and state. Number of observations
is approximately 15.000. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.250 Mark E. Doms and J. Bradford Jensen
















Note: The numbers are regression coefficients from linear models that do and do not control for
establishment size, four-digit industry, plant age, and state. The omitted group is domestically
owned establishments. Number of observations is approximately 6,800. Numbers in parentheses
are standard errors.
"K/L = capital-labor ratio (capital intensity).
Table 7.8 Differences between Foreign-Owned Establishments and Domestic













Note: All numbers are regression coefficients from linear models that control for establishment
size, four-digit industry, plant age, and state. Number of observations is approximately 6,800.
Omitted plant type is U.S. multinational. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
intensive plants. Foreign-owned plants use fewer technologies than plants
owned by U.S. multinationals. Plants owned by large domestic firms also use
fewer technologies than plants ofU.S. multinationals, and plants ofsmall U.S.
firms use even fewer technologies.
These results suggest that foreign-owned plants are more technology inten-
sive than the average domestically owned plant and, thus, offer the possibility
of more technology transfer than the average U.S. plant. The results are also
consistent with the notion that multinationals, whether foreign or domestic,
use the most technology-intensive means of production. 12
7.6 Conclusions
The results presented in this paper show that foreign-owned manufacturing
plants in the United States in 1987 have superior operating characteristics rela-
12. Using the SMT subsample, we reran all of the regressions reported in tables 7.4 and 7.5,
both with and without the number oftechnologies as a control variable. The results do not change,
in general, even with the inclusion of the technology control variable.251 Comparing Wages, Skills, and Productivity
tive to the average U.S.-owned plant. Foreign-owned plants pay higher wages,
are more capital intensive, are more technology intensive, and are more pro-
ductive than the average U.S. plant. There do not appear to be large differences
among foreign-owned plants based on country ofownership.
This being said, the results also suggest that it is not the fact that the plants
are foreign owned that is important to plant operating characteristics, rather it
is the fact that the plants are owned by multinational corporations that seems
important. Plants owned by U.S. multinationals exhibit the best operating char-
acteristics, followed by plants of foreign multinationals. The combined class
of multinationals is significantly different from both plants owned by large
domestically oriented U.S. firms and plants owned by small U.S. finns. These
results are consistent with the notion that multinationals possess some firm-
specific advantages that enable them to overcome the barriers ofFDI.
Appendix
In this appendix we present a more detailed description of the specifications
we estimate in table 7A. We use the same general set ofspecifications through-
out the paper. Below, we also present more of the coefficient estimates from
the specifications in table 7A.
For column (1)-no controls-in table 7A, we estimate
Y = a + Q Foreign owned + E,
1 tJ I'
where Y; is the dependent variable listed in the table. Table 7A.I contains the
full set ofregression coefficients.
For column (2)-with controls-in table 7A, we estimate
1'; = <X + ~ Foreign owned; + rx; + E;,
where Xi includes dummy variables for plant size, plant age, state, and industry
(see panel B of table 7.2). Table 7A.2 contains an extended set of regression
coefficients for this specification. (We suppress the industry and state results
to conserve space and to avoid disclosure issues.)
For column (3)-with controls and capital-labor ratio-in table 7.4, we es-
timate
1'; = a + ~ Foreign owned; + 3 Capital/Labor; + rXi + E;,
where Xi includes dummy variables for plant size, plant age, state, and industry
(see panel B of table 7.2). Table 7A.3 contains an extended set of regression
coefficients for this specification.Table 7A.l Differences between Domestically and Foreign-Owned Establishments
log Non- log Non- Production Production
log production production Workersl Workersl log I,
Production Worker Worker Total Total Capitall Cal
Worker Wages Wages Employment Employment Labor L"
Independent Variables Wages (I) (2) (I) (2) (1)
R2 .007 .001 .002 .003 .007 .024 .(
Intercept 2.843 3.290 3.306 .732 .718 3.009 2.(
(.001) (.002) (.002) (.00I) cOOl) (.004) (.(
Foreign owned .190 .104 .130 -.052 -.084 .941 .!
(.007) (.008) (.008) (.003) (.003) (.018) (.(
Note: The numbers are regression coefficients from linear model.~ that include an intercept and a foreign·owned dummy. Numbers ofobservations is 3jTable 7A.2 Differences between Domestically and Foreign-Owned Establishment.,
log Non- log Non- Production Production
log production production Workersl Workersl log I
Production Worker Worker Total Total Capitall Cal
Worker Wages Wages Employment Employment Labor L
Independent Variables Wages (I) (2) (I) (2) (I)
R~ .317 .144 .150 .245 .260 0407
Foreign owned .073 .012 .026 -.020 -.03\ .332
(.006) (.008) (.008) (.003) (.003) (.015) (.
Size class I (1-49) -0482 -.306 -.303 .040 .087 -.983
(.021) (.029) (.028) (.010) (.010) (.053) (.
Size class 2 (50-99) -0472 -.188 -.180 .042 .083 -.841
(.021) (.029) (.028) (.010) (.010) l.053) (.
Size class 3 (100-249) -04\2 -.179 -.162 .042 .075 -.703
l.021) (.029) (.028) (.010) (.010) (.053) ( ,
Size class 4 (250-499) -.348 -.160 -.134 .046 .066 -.587
(.021 ) (.029) (.028) (.010) (.010) (.054) (.
Size class 5 (500-999) -.263 -.138 -.102 .045 .056 -0405
(.021 ) (.030) (.029) (.0I0) (.011) (.055) (.
Size class 6 (1,000-2.499) ~.162 -.061 -.044 .023 .029 -.274
(.023) (.032) (.031 ) l.01O) (.011) (.058) (.
First census 63 .112 .128 .126 -.022 -.023 .184
(.003) (.005) (.005) (.002) (.002) (.009) (.
Firsl census 67 .093 .110 .113 -.012 -.OJ4 .166
(.005) (.007) (.006) (.002) (.002) (.012) (.
First census 72 .075 .105 .105 -.008 -.009 .135
(,004) (.006) (.006) (.002) (.00I) (.010) l.
First census 77 .049 .075 .072 -.005 -.005 .108
(.004) (.005) (.005) (.002) (.002) (.009) (.
Firsl census 82 .028 .038 .036 -.002 -.001 .066
(.003) (.005) (.005) l.(02) (.002) (.008) ( ,
Note: The numbers are regression coefficients from linear models that control for establishment size (size class 7
digit industry (results not reported), and state (results not reported). Numbers ofobservations is approximately IITable 7A.3 Ditl"erences between Domestically and Foreign-Owned Establishments
log Non- log Non- Production Production
log production production Workers/ Workers/ log Value log Value
Production Worker Worker Total Total Added/ Added/
Worker Wages Wages Employment Employment Employee Employee
Independent Variables Wages (1) (2) (I) (2) (I) (2) TFP-R TFP-FS
R' .367 .168 .177 .246 .261 .421 .391 .024 .178
Foreign owned .038 -.020 -.005 -.018 -.029 .134 .118 .038 .074
(.006) (.008) (.008) (.003) (.003) (.008) (.008) (.005) (.005)
log Capital/Labor (1) .107 .094 -.009 .231 -.001 -.152
(.001) (.002) (.001) (.002) (.00I) (.001)
log Capital/Labor (2) .096 -.010 .223
(.001) (.00I) (.002)
Size class I (1-49) -.377 -.213 -.217 .032 .079 -.280 -.225 -.089 -.242
(.020) (.028) (.002) (.010) (.010) (.029) (.029) (.017) (.019)
Size class 2 (50-99) -.382 -.109 -.107 .035 .076 -.261 -.212 -.081 -.215
(.020) (.028) (.028) (.010) (.01O) (.029) (.029) (.017) (.019)
Size class 3 (loo-249) -.337 -.113 -.100 .037 .069 -.218 -.182 -.064 -.179
(.020) (.028) (.028) (.010) (.010) (.029) (.029) (.017) (.019)
Size class 4 (250-499) -.285 -.105 -.081 .041 .060 -.153 -.132 -.038 -.123
(.020) (.029) (.028) (.010) (.01O) (.029) (.029) (.017) (.019)
Size class 5 (500-999) -.220 -.100 -.065 .041 .052 -.088 -.080 -.017 -.079
(.021) (.030) (.029) (.01O) (.01O) (.030) (.030) (.017) (.020)
Size class 6 (I,OOO-2,499) -.133 -.036 -.019 .021 .027 -.044 -.043 -.001 -.049
(.022) (.031 ) (.031) (.011) (.011) (.032) (.031) (.018) (.021)
First census 63 .093 .110 .108 -.021 -.021 -.018 -.016 -012 -.018
(.003) (.005) (.005) (.002) (.002) (.005) (.005) (.003) (.003)
First census 67 .075 .094 .098 -.011 -.012 .003 .003 .000 -.005
(.004) (.007) (.006) (.002) (.002) (.006) (.(06) (.004) (.004)
First census 72 .061 .093 .092 -.007 - .008 -.005 ~.004 -.004 -.007
(.004) (.006) (.006) (.oo2) (.002) (.005) (.005) (.003) (.004)
First census 77 .038 .065 .062 -.005 - .004 -.007 -.005 -.001 -.007
(.004) (.005) (.005) (.oo2) (.oo2) (.005) (.005) (.003) (.003)
First census 82 .021 .032 .029 -.002 -.000 -.005 -.002 - .000 -.003
(.003) (.005) (.004) (.002) (.002) (.005) (.005) (.003) (.003)
Note: The numbers are regression coefficients from linear models that control for establishment size (size class 7 omitted), plant age (census class 87 omitted), four-
digit industry (results not reported), and state (results not reported). Number of observations is approximately 115,000. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.255 Comparing Wages, Skills, and Productivity
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Comment Keith Head
Doms and Jensen ask and answer the question, How do foreign plants compare
to domestically owned plants in terms ofwages and productivity? Their answer
canbe summarized as follows. Workers at foreign-owned manufacturing plants
generate about 50 percent more value added and receive 20 percent higher
wages than employees at the average domestically owned plant. However, most
of the premiums in productivity and wages can be explained by observable
Keith Head is assistant professor in the Faculty of Commerce at the University of British Co-
lumbia.256 Mark E. Doms and J. Bradford Jensen
differences in the attributes of the plants, rather than in the form of a pure
"ownership" effect. Furthermore, the unexplained part of the premiums does
not appear to derive from their "foreignness"; rather, it appears that plants
owned by multinational corporations pay more and have higher productivity.
In fact, employees at plants owned by large u.S.-owned multinationals receive
the highest average wages. Doms and Jensen have provided a clear and con-
vincing answer to the question they posed; however, they do not explore the
policy implications oftheir work. In particular, do their results justify policies
designed to attract foreign direct investment (FDI)?
In 1994 the state of Alabama helped convince Mercedes Benz to locate a
plant there by offering an incentive package of approximately $230 million.
This topped a previous record set by Kentucky when its $147 million package
drew an auto plant from Toyota.! For initial employment levels of 1,500 and
3,000, respectively, these plants cost the host governments around $150,000
and $50,000 per job. What can Doms and Jensen's results tell us about the
return on these outlays? To start, let us assume that the only benefit to the host
economy is the higher incomes received by the workers employed at these
plants. The present value, assuming a discount rate of 0.05, of a 20 percent
wage premium over the sample average $25,000 annual earnings in manufac-
turing is $100,000. This suggests that the Kentucky bid might have been rea-
sonable but Alabama overpaid.
The 20 percent wage premium is the raw increase to wages without any
controls. After accounting for the industry, state, plant size and age, and capital
intensity of foreign-owned plants, the wage premium falls to 4 percent, or a
present value of$20,000. At this premium level, neither incentive package ap-
pears to make sense. Which number should the state governor use? It might be
argued that the exact mechanisms underlying the wage premium do not mat-
ter-just the overall result. However, the governor could allocate the funds to
alternative projects designed to improve the attributes of existing firms. For
instance, some form of general investment subsidy could be used to increase
their size and capital intensity. If such opportunities exist, then perhaps the
governor should consider only the premium attributable to foreign multina-
tional management.
The simple calculations above made two key assumptions that should now
be critiqued. First, I assumed that the wage premium constituted a welfare gain
for the host economy. Second, by focusing solely on the jobs at the particular
investment, we omit the potential for external effects. Namely, the foreign plant
may generate spillovers that benefit other local manufacturers. These spillovers
might induce subsequent investment by the same firm or its suppliers. These
factors could make us revise our estimates ofthe benefits ofFDI upward ifthe
wage premium does not represent a welfare improvement ordownward ifthere
are substantial positive spillovers.
1. More details on both incentive packages can be found in the New York Times, 4 October 1994.257 Comparing Wages, Skills, and Productivity
What causes foreign-owned plants to pay higher average wages? To answer
this question it is useful to considersome alternative hypotheses. First, suppose
foreign-owned plants employ different, but technically equal, management
methods. Then we would expect no difference in productivity and would inter-
pret a wage premium as evidence of a compensating differential to induce
domestic workers to accept foreign management. Alternatively, suppose work-
ers are indifferent as to ownership but foreign finns really do possess superior
techniques. Then we would expect a productivity premium, but wages would
be determined by the alternative opportunity of working for a domestic finn.
The finding of both wage and productivity premiums might argue for a supe-
rior technology that imposes costs on the workers for which they must be com-
pensated.
The high wage premium paid by U.S. multinational-owned plants suggests
that the compensation does not reflect aversion to foreign control per se. It
could be that the higher wages paid by foreign and domestic multinationals
reflect the outcome ofa bargaining game in which workers share the extra rents
generated by the superiortechnologies used by multinational-owned plants.An
alternative interpretation consistent with high productivity and wages would
be that multinational plants use production processes that require higher levels
of effort from their employees. One reason might be that multinationals have
a greater stake in maintaining a reputation for product quality. Alternatively,
the multinational may use technologies that make intensive use ofmore highly
skilled-and hence, better paid-workers.
If the wage premium represents compensation for higher effort or greater
skills, individual workers may not benefit from employment at a multinational.
In one case they have to work harder, in the other case they probably gave up
high-paying jobs at other finns. Even ifindividual workers do not receive a net
benefit from working at a multinational plant, the local government may value
the increase in the income tax revenues it can obtain as a result ofhigher aver-
age wages. If the skill intensity story is correct, attracting a multinational-
owned plant would tend to draw an inflow of skilled workers from other states
that might be viewed as a desirable development in its own right.
Defenders of large incentive packages would probably argue that the most
critical flaw in the calculations I made on the return to attracting foreign invest-
ors is the omission of"job creation" beyond the direct employment ofthe finn.
They would probably point to complementary investments by supplier firms
and to the likelihood of future expansion by Mercedes and Toyota. Indeed,
Toyota is expected to increase its employment in Kentucky to 6,000, and there
are already a couple dozen new Japanese-owned parts suppliers in the state.
In addition, superior technologies employed by multinational plants may
spill over to domestic finns, causing additional productivity and wage in-
creases beyond those at the assembly plants themselves. These externality is-
sues could be addressed using the Doms and Jensen data set if it can be ex-
tended to include a time-series dimension. With better estimates of the258 Mark E. Doms and J. Bradford Jensen
magnitudes of the indirect effects of multinational investments, we could ob-
tain more precise measures oftheir value to host governments. Even with more
precise quantifications of the potential benefits to host-country governments,
competition between states may bid away most ofthe benefits after subtracting
the cost of the incentive package. It seems likely that there will be a push for
policy reforms designed to curb the tendency of local governments to overbid
for investments. The results of Doms and Jensen provide a useful component
in evaluating potential agreements on investment incentives.